BUSINESS FORMATION & SALES BLOG

Are Religious Organizations Required to Pay Property Taxes?

Tax-exempt religious organizations are generally exempted from paying property taxes.  To avail itself of this exemption, the religious organization must show that:

     (1) the owner of the property is organized exclusively for a tax-exempt purpose;

     (2) the property is actually and exclusively used for the tax-exempt purpose; and

     (3) the owner’s operation and use of the property is not for profit.

This test was recently applied by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey in City of Newark of the County of Essex v. (148) Block 1861, Lot 24, 605-611 Central Avenue, 2010 WL 3932996 (N.J. Super. A.D. September 27, 2010). In 2007, the City of Newark filed suit against Yes Lord Ministries, Inc. (“Yes Lord”) for back taxes.  In 2008, Newark rejected that application. The trial court then granted summary judgment in favor of Newark, allowing it to foreclose on the property for failure to pay taxes.  Yes Lord appealed to the Appellate Division.

In rendering its decision, the Appellate Division noted that the building was purchased by Yes Lord in 2004 and consisted of approximately 20,000 square feet.  The warehouse portion of it was structurally intact; but the offices were completely unusable due to roof leakage and dangerous wiring.  Yes Lord intended to renovate the property for church activities, but that work was delayed by financial obstacles.  Yes Lord never paid property taxes on the property and it owed more than $120,000 in delinquent taxes and redemption fees when Newark started the lawsuit.

Yes, Lord claimed that the warehouse portion of the property was being used for meetings of men’s and women’s auxiliary groups related to church activities and for other prayer services.  However, the property was not open to the public for regular church services and Yes Lord did not possess a Certificate of Occupancy for the property.  Newark conceded that Yes Lord was organized exclusively for a recognized tax-exempt purpose and that its use of the property was not for profit.  However, Newark claimed that Yes Lord was not “actually using” the property for the tax-exempt purpose.

The Court relied heavily upon the decision in Grace & Peace Fellowship Church, Inc. v. Cranford Twp., 4 N.J. Tax 391 (Tax 1982).  In Grace & Peace, the Tax Court determined that “an uncompleted church building was not exempt from taxation because occasional meetings of church auxiliary and prayer groups were being held in the building during the construction work.”  Grace & Peace Fellowship Church at 394-95, 401.  The Tax Court also noted that the church did not receive a Certificate of Occupancy until after the date of tax assessment, despite using  the property for religious services.  The Tax Court reasoned that “the public benefit underlying the tax exemption had not yet begun and that denying tax exemption was both consistent with the language of the statute (N.J.S.A. 54:4-1) and an appropriate incentive for the exempt organization to complete the construction.”  Id. at 397-401.

The Appellate Division held that Yes Lord was not “actually using” the property for the tax-exempt purpose.  It further held that New Jersey law (N.J.S.A. 54:4-1 et seq.) implied that the “actual use” of the property must be legally authorized.  Thus, a Certificate of Occupancy was required to use the warehouse.  Yes Lord did not have a Certificate of Occupancy, so its use of the property was not legally authorized and it was not entitled to exemption from property taxes on it.

Comments/Questions: ljm@gdnlaw.com

© 2010 Nissenbaum Law Group, LLC

How Can a Charity Lose Its Tax-Exempt Status?

A charity’s tax-exempt status under §501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code may be revoked for many reasons. However, the most common is if the charity stops operating exclusively for charitable purposes.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has developed and applied a 2-prong test “drawn directly from the wording of §501(c)(3) and the legislative history of its enactment. The statute explicitly cites as qualifying for tax exemption those entities ‘organized exclusively for religious, charitable . . . or educational purposes.’”  Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 743 F.2d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 1984).  That inquiry requires courts to determine: (1) the purpose of the organization claiming tax-exempt status and (2) to whose benefit the organization’s activities inure.

In Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co., the lower Tax Court affirmed revocation of tax-exempt status for Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. (“P&R”).  The Tax Court reasoned that P&R, a religiously-oriented publishing house that was tax-exempt since 1939, had become a profitable venture as of 1980. By that point it had only a distant relationship to a church. P&R was engaged in the publication of religiously-oriented books that had become similar to a commercial enterprise.

In reaching its decision, The Tax Court considered the following factors: (a) that P&R’s net and gross profits between 1969 and 1979 increased dramatically; (b) that the prices set for its books generated consistent and comfortable profit margins; and (c) that it was in competition with commercial publishers as a result of its purchase and sale of books with a commercial publishing house. After weighing these factors, the Tax Court determined that P&R was not operating exclusively for charitable purposes and revoked its tax-exempt status.

However, that decision was reversed on appeal. The Third Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court and held that P&R would not lose its 501(c)(3) status.  The Third Circuit cited the 2-prong inquiry referred to above, which was drawn from the plain language of the statute and its legislative history.  That legislative history included a statement by the sponsor of the statute, Senator Bacon, who made the following comments:

[T]he corporation which I had particularly in mind as an illustration at the time I drew this amendment is the Methodist Book Concern, which has its headquarters in Nashville, which is a very large printing establishment, and in which there must necessarily be profit made, and there is a profit made exclusively for religious, benevolent, charitable, and educational purposes, in which no man receives a scintilla of individual profit.  Of course if that were the only one, it might not be a matter that you would say we would be justified in changing these provisions of law to meet a particular case, but there are in greater or lesser degree such institutions scattered all over this country.  If Senators will mark the words, the amendment is very carefully guarded, so as not to include any institution where there is any individual profit, and further than that, where any of the funds are devoted to any purpose other than those which are religious, benevolent, charitable, and educational. (emphasis added)  Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. at 153.

In its analysis, the Third Circuit first determined to whose benefit the organization’s activities inured.  The Court determined there was no factual basis for concluding that P&R’s increased commercial activity inured to the personal benefit of any individual.  There was no evidence of personal enrichment of any individual at P&R.  In fact, the highest salaried employee of P&R in 1979 received $15,350; none of the seven other paid employees received annual salaries over $12,500 and five were paid under $6,250.  The Court was satisfied that the benefits of the organization’s activities did not inure to any individual.  For comparison purposes, see Church of Scientology of California v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Claims 1969) (since church allowed leader of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard, to receive ten percent of church’s gross income instead of a salary, the earnings of the church directly inured to the private benefit of Mr. Hubbard and tax-exempt status was denied to the Church of Scientology).

Second, the Third Circuit determined P&R’s purpose.  It held that its purpose was religious, despite the fact that it was not formally affiliated with or under the control of any particular church.

Third, the Third Circuit considered the Tax Court’s concern that P&R was accumulating “profits.”  As early as March, 1974, P&R notified the IRS that it was accumulating surplus cash as a “building fund” and actually used this fund to purchase land in Harmony, New Jersey.  In 1978, P&R built a combined warehouse/office building on that site using the fund and in 1979 purchased equipment using the fund.  P&R’s notice to the IRS and the IRS’ recognition of P&R’s expansion led the Third Circuit to conclude that this accumulation of cash did not amount to “profits” such that P&R’s tax-exempt status was in jeopardy.  The Third Circuit was satisfied that P&R had not deviated from its claimed tax-exempt purpose, despite the accumulation of a cash surplus.

On this basis, the Third Circuit reversed the decision of the Tax Court and permitted P&R to maintain its tax-exempt status.

Comments/Questions: ljm@gdnlaw.com

© 2010 Nissenbaum Law Group, LLC

One Cannot Fraudulently Transfer Business Assets to a Related Business to Escape a Creditor

On July 19, 2010, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York decided a case regarding the issue of successor liability and fraudulent conveyance in which a debtor transferred its assets to a related business and left a creditor without any return on its investment or any repayment on its loan.  The Court in Silverman Partners LP v. The Verox Group et al., 2010 WL 2899438 (S.D.N.Y.) held that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to show that it could be inferred that Verox Technologies was a continuation of Verox Group, and in addition that there may have been a fraudulent conveyance.  Id. at 5-6.  The Court cited plaintiff’s allegations as:
After Verox Group ceased doing business, Verox Technologies continued to operate under the direction of Verox Group’s Managing Members, with Verox Group’s EPA registrations, and all of Verox Group’s assets.  Verox Technologies also hired two of Verox Group’s independent sales representatives and conducted business with some of Verox Group’s former customers.  While Verox Technologies was registered in Nevada and Verox Group in Delaware, both have their principal places of business in New Hampshire and that they occupy the same physical location.  Verox Group is now a shell company with no cash or other assets and that there was, essentially, a de facto merger between Verox Group and Verox Technologies.
Id.at 2.

 

 Verox Group transferred all of its assets to Verox Technologies sometime after June 21, 2007, that the Managing Members devised a scheme where they created Verox Technologies to avoid the debts and obligations which Verox Group owed to Plaintiff, and that the transfer was made by Verox Group and received by Verox Technologies with actual intent to hinder, delay and/or defraud Plaintiff as a shareholder and creditor.
 Id. at 6.
The Court held that based upon the pleadings, plaintiff alleged sufficient facts such that it could be inferred that the buyer de facto merged with a seller. Since that would mean that the buyer was a mere continuation of the seller, and the transactions were undertaken to defraud creditors, the Court denied Verox Technologies’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims.  Id. at 5-6.

Comments/Questions: ljm@gdnlaw.com

© 2009 Nissenbaum Law Group, LLC

New York Court Upholds Cause of Action for Indemnification Under Asset Purchase Agreement

On July 19, 2010, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York decided a case in which it interpreted an asset purchase agreement (“APA”). The Court in Koch Industries, Inc. v. Aktiengesellschaft, — F.Supp.2d –, 2010 WL 2927441 (S.D.N.Y.) held that “when defendants sold plaintiffs a polyester manufacturing business in 1998, defendants fraudulently concealed that the business was violating antitrust laws.” Under the indemnification provision of the APA, , the plaintiffs would be entitled to damages for the period prior to the closing.  The reason was that the terms of the APA clearly applied to that situation,

 

“[u]nder the APA, defendants agreed to indemnify plaintiffs for losses associated with the conduct of the polyester business prior to the Closing. Specifically, Section 2.4 of the APA requires Hoechst to pay all “Retained Liabilities” and provides that the “Buyer [Kosa] shall not assume or become liable for any obligations, liabilities or indebtedness of any member of the Seller Group, and … the members of the Seller Group shall retain all of their respective liabilities, other than the Assumed Liabilities, whether or not relating to the ownership or operation of the Polyester Business.” Section 17.2(a)(i) of the APA requires Hoechst “to defend, indemnify and hold harmless the Buyer Indemnified Parties from and against … [a]ny and all Losses resulting from or in connection with, directly or indirectly, the failure of Seller and its Affiliates to pay, perform and discharge when due all Retained Liabilities.”
Id. at 1-2.

 

The Court held that “Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden at summary judgment to show that defendants are liable, under the indemnification provision of the APA, for a portion of the Defense Costs that constitutes “Retained Liabilities.” The calculation of proper damages on the indemnity claim remains an issue for trial.” Id. at 23.

Comments/Questions: ljm@gdnlaw.com

© 2009 Nissenbaum Law Group, LLC

Lack of Bad Faith as a Basis for a Court Not to Award Attorneys Fees To a Minority Shareholder who Sues to Obtain Compensation for her Shares

Earlier this year, a State Court in Delaware determined the value of a minority shareholder’s shares which was in dispute. The unpublished opinion, In re Sunbelt Beverage Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 2010 WL 26539 (Del.Ch. Jan 05, 2010) (No. Civ. A. 16089-CC), reconsideration den., In re Sunbelt Beverage Corp. S’holder Litig., 2010 WL 692400 (Del.Ch. Feb 15, 2010) (NO. CIV.A. 16089-CC) was brought by Jane Goldring, a “former minority shareholder in [a] beverage corporation, who had been forced out of [the]corporation as result of [a] cash-out merger of a former corporation into beverage corporation. [The shareholder] filed suit against individual members of [the] beverage corporation’s board of directors, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, and seeking [rescission] or, the alternative, an appraisal of fair value of her shares as of merger date.” Id. at 1.

The Court analyzed the different ways a minority shareholder’s interest can be evaluated for purposes of determining the value the shareholder should be paid, whether in the form of a sales price or damages. The Court rejected a number of approaches, but ultimately used a discounted cash flow calculation to arrive at the compensation the minority shareholder should receive.

Importantly, the Court then granted her an additional award of court costs, such as expert witness fees, but refused to provide her with reimbursement of her attorneys fees. The reason the Court refused to award attorneys fees was based on a lack of bad faith on the part of the defendants. The Court reasoned that although the defendants’ “WPG Formula” for valuation of the shares was rejected by the Court, it was not submitted in bad faith.

“I agree with defendants’ analysis on the issue of shifting attorney fees: “to constitute bad faith [and thus warrant shifting of attorney fees contrary to the American Rule], the defendants’ action must rise to a high level of egregiousness.” Here, I cannot find defendants’ actions to be of the egregious, vexatious, or bad-faith sort that have merited the shifting of attorney fees in earlier cases… I believe defendants’ reliance on the transactions priced at the WPG Formula was sufficiently reasoned to preclude a finding that there was no legal issue in this case upon which reasonable parties could differ. That is, parties could and did reasonably differ on the legal import of the WPG Formula. The WPG Formula ultimately may have had no weight in my valuation analysis and may have played an unduly large role in guiding defendants’ other valuations of Sunbelt stock at the time of the 1997 Merger, but it did present me with a legitimate legal question and a potentially legitimate valuation metric for Sunbelt. I therefore do not find defendants to have conducted themselves with the necessary egregiousness or vexatiousness to warrant shifting attorneys’ fees.” 

Id. at 9


Comments/Questions: ljm@gdnlaw.com

© 2009 Nissenbaum Law Group, LLC

What Value Should be Assigned to Shares Under a Buy Sell Agreement in Which the Value is Not Listed in the Contract?

A buy sell agreement is an effective tool to create a predictable value for shares in a closed (non-public) corporation. However, what happens if the buy sell provision refers to an exhibit that is not attached and the formula simply cannot be applied as intended in the agreement? The New York Appellate Division dealt with that issue in Sullivan v. Troser Management, Inc.,    N.Y.S.2d    , 2010 WL 2636019 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.), 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 05894

That case was decided on July 2, 2010. “[T]he dispute … relate[d] to the value of an 18% stock interest in a ski resort under the parties’ “buysellagreement (“agreement”).” The Court held that “the purchase price provision of the agreement [was] unenforceable, and the value of plaintiff’s stock should therefore be determined pursuant to the formula set forth in the unrelated New York case, Lewis v. Vladeck, Elias, Vladeck, Zimny & Engelhard(57 N.Y.2d 975), i.e., based on a percentage interest in defendant’s assets.” Id at 1.

The Court concluded that “[t]he ‘Purchase Price’ provision of the agreement expressly states that the price of the shares of stock shall be ‘an amount agreed upon annually by the Stockholders as set forth on the attached Schedule A.’ It is undisputed that no Schedule A exist[ed]. That provision further state[d] that, ‘[i]n the event that no annual value is established, the value shall be the last agreed upon value except that if no such agreed upon value is established for a period of two years, the value shall be the last agreed upon value increased or decreased by reference to an increase or decrease in book value of [defendant] from the date of the last agreed upon value to the date of death or disability” of the stockholder seeking to sell his or her shares.’ Id at 1

The problem was that “the stockholders … never agreed upon a value of the stock, and … the purchase price of [the] shares therefore [could] not be ascertained in accordance with the terms of the agreement… Indeed, there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff has ever agreed upon a value of the stock.  Id at 2


Therefore, the method of valuation was based solely on a percentage interest (in this case, 18%) in the assets of the ski resort.


Comments/Questions: ljm@gdnlaw.com

© 2009 Nissenbaum Law Group, LLC

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