INTERNET LAW BLOG

New York Enacts the Truth in Music Advertising Act

Entertainment Law:  The New York State legislature enacted a new statute specifically aimed at advertising in the music industry.  The Truth in Music Advertising Act, NY Art & Cult Aff. § 34.01, et seq., was effective as of September 14, 2007 and specifically proscribes that:

“No performing group shall use, advertise or promote a live musical performance or production through the use of a false, deceptive or misleading affiliation, connection or association between a recording group and a performing group where such performing group is seeking to use the same or a substantially similar name as such recording group.”
In other words, the law prohibits, with certain exceptions a musical group from misleading the public with regard to a live musical performance in New York by indicating an affiliation with another group, at least one member of which has previously released a commercial sound recording under the group’s name.  This could play out in a number of ways.  First, it would arguably prohibit a band from performing under a name that has been used by a recording group.  Likewise, the law would arguably prohibit the advertisement of a band under a name that is similar to that of a recording group.
The law dovetails with current State and Federal trademark and advertising laws, however it provides a specific cause of action and right for the Attorney General to seek a remedy in the proscribed wrongful behavior.  Moreover, the law provides for an assessment of civil penalties of up to $5,000.00 for a first violation, and up to $15,000.00 for subsequent violations.  This is in addition to other damages that may be available when seeking remedies under other laws, such as trademark law.  The law also specifically allows the Attorney General to obtain injunctions in relation to this conduct.
However, the challenge is the breadth of the statute.  The law does not appear to be intent-based. Moreover, the proscribed exceptions do not include the unknowing use of a recording group’s name.  It is therefore possible that a performing group could assume a name that is already in use by a recording group, and therefore be unwittingly in violation of the law.  This is compounded by the broad definition of “recording group.”  As stated, to be considered a recording group, the group need only have had one member release a commercial sound recording under that group’s name, and that sound recording can be of any nature in which the sound can be fixed, including CD, tape or computerized file.  Accordingly, a group could arguably meet this definition very easily.
Through the adoption of the Truth in Music Advertising Act, New York joins the over one-dozen other states that have adopted similar statutes, including New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut and Florida.  Interestingly, the New York law is aimed only at the use or advertisement of a name by a performing group.  This is a variation from other states laws.  For instance, New Jersey’s Truth in Music Advertising Act prohibits “any person” from such advertising or usage.  Accordingly, whereas the New Jersey law could arguably be used to also prohibit a venue from falsely advertising a performance by a recording group, the New York law does not appear to provide for such a violation against anyone other than the performing group itself.
Notably, these truth in advertising laws tend to be relatively new phenomena, with many of the statutes being enacted only in the past couple of years.  Accordingly, there is little case law interpreting or challenging the import of the laws.  New Jersey’s Truth in Music Advertising Act, which was adopted in January 2007 is now being challenged in the courts.  Specifically, there is a case pending in the U.S. District Court of New Jersey which represents one of the first cases to try to enforce the law’s reach.  Also pending is a current lawsuit against State Attorney General Anne Milgram challenging the enforcement of the law.
We therefore recommend the following:
· Musical groups should obtain legal counsel prior to adopting a group name in order to ensure that such name is not already in use, and in order to secure its rights to the name
· Venues and musical groups should ensure that any and all advertising relating to their live performances in New York have been cleared by legal counsel prior to their publication and distribution; and
· Venues and musical groups alike should ensure that their contracts address this new law and the responsibilities of each party relating to the same.

New Jersey Enacts Internet Safety Dating Act

Internet Law:  The New Jersey Legislature recently passed the “Internet Safety Dating Act,” making it one of the first states to enact legislation of this nature, aimed at protecting against online predators.  Notably, the law applies to all websites that offer services to New Jersey residents.  A website, even if not based in New Jersey, must comply with the law’s edicts if it will have New Jersey residents that access or otherwise use the website.  The law became effective May 12, 2008.

The Internet Safety Dating Act requires an “Internet Dating Service,” to provide certain disclaimers on its website with regard to whether or not the site conducts criminal background screenings on website members.  Importantly, the Act defines an “Internet Dating Service” quite broadly.  Such a service is deemed to be any “person or entity directly or indirectly in the business, for a profit, of offering, promoting or providing access to dating, relationship, compatibility, matrimonial or social referral services principally on or through the Internet.”  This has been analyzed as including social networking websites.

Subject websites must provide a series of disclaimers, such as:

    • Providing specific safety awareness notifications that, without limitation, include a “list and description of safety measures reasonably designed to increase awareness of safer dating practices.”  Though the Act provides some flexibility in terms of how a website can accomplish this, it provides examples and suggestions for such a notification.

 

    • If the website will not be conducting criminal background screenings, it must disclose, clearly and conspicuously, to all New Jersey members the fact that it does not conduct such screenings.  The disclosure must be written in bold, capital letters in at least 12 point font.  The law further specifies how the disclosure needs to be sent to members, and mandates that it be sent through at least two of those forms.

 

    • On the other hand, if the website does conduct criminal background screenings prior to allowing a member to join the site, the website needs to include that as a disclosure on the website.  Again, this disclosure must be written in bold, capital letters in at least 12 point font.  This disclosure needs to be on all website pages used when a New Jersey member signs up.

 

  • Further, if the website does conduct such screenings, it will need to disclose whether it nevertheless allows someone who is identified as having had a criminal conviction to enter the site and communicate with New Jersey members.  The law also mandates that it also provide notice to members that all criminal background screenings are not foolproof, that they may provide a false sense of security, and other disclosures along these lines.

The Internet Safety Dating Act was enacted under New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud statute.  Accordingly, a violation of the Act constitutes a violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, and without limitation, a violator may be subject to treble (3x) damages.

We therefore recommend the following:

    • In light of the national (and international) reach of websites, we recommend that all companies that operate a website that might be construed as a dating or social networking site comply with the New Jersey law, regardless of whether it has a direct relationship to New Jersey.  Unless you are expressly prohibiting New Jersey residents from joining or using your site, arguably, by merely launching your website, you are offering your services to New Jersey residents and therefore need to comply with the Internet Safety Dating Act.

 

  • All subject websites should immediately consult with counsel in order to have their screening protocols and disclaimers reviewed to ensure compliance with the Internet Safety Dating Act.

Comments/Questions:

ljm@gdnlaw.com

 

New Jersey Court Requires a Litigant to Prove Damages in Defamation Case

New Jersey Caselaw: In Suarez v. NJ.com, an unpublished opinion, the New Jersey Appellate Division recently found that a defamation plaintiff must prove damages even when he already proved that the comments were made with actual malice. The Court noted that there are times when a litigant does not need to prove damages in a defamation case but this case did not fall within that exception.

In the Suarez case, a statement alleged that the Ridgefield, New Jersey Mayor, a councilman and several police officers went to the author’s home at six o’clock in the morning, investigating an erroneous anonymous tip that he had an illegal apartment. The posting of this statement spurred numerous additional bloggers, many of whom expressed sympathetic comments. The Mayor of the town sued the anonymous writer for defamation, denying that he was ever involved in any such home inspection and alleging that his reputation had been harmed as a result of the statement. The writer admitted under oath that the statement was not true, confessing that the incident did not occur at his home but that it was merely a story he heard from his attorney and friend who was the prosecutor in the town.

Even though the writer made false statements, the Court did not permit the Mayor to proceed with his defamation case. As a public figure, the Mayor had a greater burden of proof. Essentially, he needed to prove that (a) the writer acted with actual malice in making the statements against the Mayor; and (b) he suffered actual damages as a result of the publication of those statements.

The law provides for added flexibility with regard to speech made about public officials. The First Amendment encourages speech by public officials and therefore requires actual malice by the speaker in order for a public figure to proceed with a defamation claim. Actual malice generally means making a statement with actual knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false. Thus, since the statements in this case were “of public concern,” the Court examined those statements more closely.

Nonetheless, the court noted that even if the court found that defendant acted with actual malice in making the statements, the plaintiff would still be required to prove that his reputation was actually damaged as a result. In the end, the court rejected the Mayor’s claims because he failed to provide sufficient information or other evidence as to how his reputation was actually damaged.

This case highlights the difficulty for a public official to win a defamation case with added scrutiny and additional elements that a public official must prove. Any person who believes that a defamatory statement has been made about them should seek the advice of counsel in order to determine whether the claim will be subject to such heightened scrutiny.

Comments/Questions: ljm@gdnlaw.com

© 2008 Nissenbaum Law Group, LLC

State v. Reid: New Jersey Protects the Confidentiality of Internet Subscriber Information

New Jersey Caselaw: Through State v. Reid, 194 N.J. 386 (2008), the New Jersey Supreme Court recently issued a landmark holding that Internet subscriber information is protected from disclosure because it is considered confidential. The confidentiality can be overcome by a demonstration of relevancy, however, the person who is the subject of the request must be given a reasonable opportunity to contest the turn over at a judicial hearing.

In Reid, the State prosecuted a case where a company alleged that a former employee was stealing its proprietary information using a confidential Internet password. The underlying act was traced to a Comcast IP address. IP addresses are generally anonymous, and the identity of the person or persons who act through a particular IP address is not generally evident. Comcast refused to provide the user information relating to that IP address when initially requested. However, when a subpoena was issued to it, Comcast revealed the defendant’s Internet subscriber information. Notably, Comcast’s response to the subpoena was without notice to the defendant and without a judicial hearing. The defendant then sought to suppress this information as evidence on the basis that Comcast had revealed the user information in a manner that violated her constitutional right to privacy.

The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that while it might not have violated her privacy right under the United States Constitution, the New Jersey Constitution provides enhanced privacy rights that were violated. Specifically, Article I, Paragraph 7 states that people who live in New Jersey have a right of privacy; while the federal constitution does not explicitly guaranty such a privacy right. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is not violated by a subpoena seeking such information.

However, since New Jersey’s Constitution provides this an enhanced right to privacy, its State and Municipal Courts are required to provide notice to the subject of the subpoena and an opportunity to contest the production. In such a hearing, the relevancy of the material sought is the key to determining whether production is warranted. Importantly, this protection extends to more than just Internet service provider records, but also long-distance phone billing records and bank records, as well. In reaching this holding, the Court noted the sensitive and personal information that can be communicated through these methods of communication that are now ingrained into our daily lives.

Comments/Questions: ljm@gdnlaw.com

Can Schools Punish Internet Bullies?

Commentary: School bureaucracies have one overriding goal: to exert control over student life sufficient to create an atmosphere conducive to learning. However, when that control is exerted outside school premises, students may legitimately question whether it is wise or even legal for the school to have such authority.

Internet bullying is a perfect case in point. There are many examples of the ways in which it can invade the process of learning: the teacher in Florida who was the subject of a sexually demeaning post by her student (resulting in a $1000 judgment); or the principal in Pennsylvania who sued over a MySpace posting that posted derogatory comments about him (suspension of the student was upheld by the trial court and is now on appeal).

However, there have also been cases in which a student has sued the school district for impairing his First Amendment rights. This has involved everything from a student who was forced to leave the school because he posted rap songs that the school district found objectionable to a young man who was temporarily forced to leave a school because he posted negative comments about the school administration. Each of these instances resulted in an award or settlement involving money damages to the student.

The dividing line seems to be whether a credible case can be made that the student’s Internet posting is linked to disrupting the school’s efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to learning. In other words, although the behavior occurs outside of school, could its impact boomerang back to the scholastic environment? Without that element, it appears that the courts will generally favor the student’s First Amendment rights to Internet speech. In such instance, the courts appear reticent to enforce the school’s right to regulate the extracurricular behavior of its students.

Comments/Questions: ljm@gdnlaw.com

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